A perspective on (neo-)Darwinism (2010) by Strauss, D.F.M.
 Koers 74(3) 2009:341-386  341 
A perspective on (neo-)Darwinism (2010)1 
D.F.M. Strauss 
Faculty of the Humanities 




A perspective on (neo-)Darwinism (2010) 
A perspective on (neo-)Darwinism first of all has to account for 
those assumptions derived from the humanities, causing neo-
Darwinism not to be a purely special scientific or natural 
scientific theory. A discussion of the many-sidedness of living 
entities highlights the difficulties surrounding a definition of 
biology. Attention is briefly given to the physicalism of Darwin’s 
1859 work before the quest for origins is discussed. These 
considerations pave the way for an assessment of striking 
shortcomings in the thought of Darwin and his followers. In 
particular, modern nominalism is identified as an important 
source for neo-Darwinism, especially manifest in the idea that 
organisms are not types and do not have types (Simpson). 
Darwin’s idea of incremental (continuous) change both in 
respect of the genesis of a complex organ (or the origination of 
the first living entity) and of successive fossil forms contradict 
the current state of affairs – and the same applies to his own 
radical idea that “injurious” variations will be eliminated 
immediately by natural selection, for it cannot be reconciled to 
the role of mutations in neo-Darwinian theory. In addition neo-
Darwinian paleontologists pointed out that evolution requires 
intermediate forms and paleontology does not provide them 
(Kitts) and explicitly confessed that they have paid lip-service to 
the idea of change while they knew all the time that it was not 
true (Eldredge): the dominant theme of the paleontological 
record is stasis, constancy – a type appears and remains 
constant for millions of years before it disappears (Gould). The 
                                      
1 This article was first presented as a Stoker Lecture in Potchefstroom on 
22 October 2009. 
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supposition of incremental continuity received a further blow 
from the “Cambrian explosion”, the “nasty fact” that most “major 
animal groups appeared simultaneously” about 530 million 
years ago. A few aspects of the uniqueness of humankind are 
treated as well as the confused picture found in an attempt to 
synthesise neo-Darwinism and Christianity. In an appendix a 
brief assessment is added concerning the pretentions of neo-
Darwinism. 
Opsomming 
’n Perspektief op die (neo-)Darwinisme (2010) 
’n Perspektief op die neo-Darwinisme moet allereers rekenskap 
gee van daardie geesteswetenskaplike aannames wat daartoe 
gelei het dat die neo-Darwinisme nie ’n suiwer vakweten-
skaplike teorie en ook nie ’n suiwer natuurwetenskaplike teorie 
is nie. ’n Bespreking van die veelsydigheid van lewende dinge 
belig die probleme verbonde aan ’n definisie van die biologie. 
Aandag is vlugtig gegee aan die fisikalisme van Darwin se 
1859-werk alvorens die sug na oorspronge bespreek is. Hierdie 
oorwegings het die weg gebaan vir ’n beoordeling van die tref-
fende tekortkomings in die denke van Darwin en sy volgelinge. 
In die besonder is die moderne nominalisme geïdentifiseer as ’n 
belangrike bron vir die neo-Darwinisme, veral gemanifesteer in 
die idee dat organismes nie tipes is of tipes kan hê nie (Simp-
son). Darwin se idee van geleidelik (kontinue) verandering ten 
opsigte van die ontstaan van ’n komplekse orgaan (of die ont-
staan van die eerste lewende entiteit) asook van opeenvolgen-
de fossielvorms is in stryd met die huidige stand van sake – en 
dieselfde geld vir sy eie radikale siening dat “nadelige” variasies 
onmiddellik deur natuurlike seleksie geëlimineer sal word, want 
dit kan nie versoen word met die rol van mutasies in die neo-
Darwinistiese teorie nie. Bykomend het neo-Darwinistiese pa-
leontoloë daarop gewys dat evolusie tussenvorms vereis en dat 
die paleontologie dit nie lewer nie (Kitts). Hulle het openlik bely 
dat hulle lippediens gelewer het aan die vermeende verande-
ring in the paleontologie terwyl hulle al die tyd geweet het dit is 
nie waar nie (Eldredge): die dominante tema van die paleonto-
logie is stasis, konstantheid – ’n tipe verskyn en bly konstant vir 
miljoene jare alvorens dit verdwyn (Gould). Die aanname van 
geleidelik-kontinue verandering het ’n verdere terugslag ont-
vang van die “Cambrian explosion”, die “nasty fact” dat die 
meeste “major animal groups appeared simultaneously” om-
trent 530 miljoen jaar gelede. Enkele fasette van die uniekheid 
van die mens is aan die orde gestel asook die verwarde prentjie 
wat aangetref word in ’n poging om die neo-Darwinisme met die 
Christendom te versoen. In ’n aanhangsel word ’n oorsigtelike 
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beoordeling van die pretensies van die neo-Darwinisme be-
handel. 
1. Orientation 
Highlighting shortcomings and problems within the Darwinian and 
neo-Darwinian legacy naturally has to cover a wide range of issues 
and perspectives that are not always necessarily directly connected 
to each other. However, in this article they are integrated within the 
overall aim to obtain a critical perspective on this intellectual legacy 
within the West. 
The historically significant year, 1859, marks the appearance of 
Darwin’s work On the origin of species by means of natural selec-
tion; or, The preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. 
The appearance of this book inspired reflections on its impact from 
various corners during 2009, coupled with Darwin’s bicentenary (he 
was born in 1809). This article aims at contributing to this appraisal 
of the work and influence of Darwin and its reinforcement through 
the subsequent development of neo-Darwinism.2 Note that the mis-
understanding is widespread that there is just one theory of “evolu-
tion”. We shall see below that twentieth-century biology in fact 
knows diverse (and mutally conflicting) biological orientations. In ad-
dition, Darwin’s place within the intellectual tradition of the West will 
have to be explained as well. This entails that we will have to assess 
whether or not the (neo-)Darwinian theory of evolution is a special 
scientific theory, that is to say. Is it a truly biological theory? Of 
course the other side of the coin suggests that this theory of evolu-
tion exceeds the boundaries of biology as a special science. 
We commence our discussion by focusing on a number of unavoid-
able foundational issues. In the first instance we shall reflect on the 
inevitable pre-scientific awareness of the diversity within reality as a 
foundational condition for a discipline such as biology. The discon-
tinuity entailed in this diversity implies that the assumed continuous 
transition from the non-living to the living and within the living from 
the lowest to the highest forms harbours a speculative, and there-
fore, problematic stance. By embarking upon a closer analysis of the 
                                      
2 In the main text and in the appendix this appraisal will briefly pay attention to 
questions not normally asked, and considerations usually not contemplated, 
such as whether or not the (neo-)Darwinian theory of evolution is a purely 
biological theory (special scientific in nature); if it is objective and neutral; 
whether it is a natural scientific theory; and whether it finds sufficient support in 
factual data. 
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many-sidedness of living entities the idea of a diversity of functional 
aspects will be further substantiated. 
2. Defining biology 
2.1 What is plant science and what is a plant? 
Suppose biology is subdivided in plant science and animal science – 
leaving aside for the moment the currently fasionable practice to 
distinguish up to five realms (kingdoms) among living entities – and 
then consider the question: What is botany? Suppose that the 
answer is: “Botany (plant science) is a study of plants”. Whoever ac-
cepts this definition has to concede that formulating it does not form 
a part of practicing the discipline of botany. Defining botany indeed 
is not a study of plants, but merely a study of the study of plants. 
This argument does not claim that knowledge of botany is underesti-
mated or that the specialist knowledge of a botanist is disregarded. 
Surely a botanist is well-equipped to provide such a definition. Yet, 
the question is not who provides the definition, but rather what is the 
nature of the definition? It is clear that the answer which we have in 
mind does not form a part of botany.  
Biologists may be inclined to argue that only a competent botanist 
will be able to articulate a proper definition of botany. Without dis-
agreeing from this argument, however, we have to note that the 
crucial issue is not who gives the definition, but what is the nature of 
the definition. Since defining botany is not a study of plants, formu-
lating such a definition obviously does not belong to the discipline of 
botany. The theoretical domain within which scholarly disciplines 
(that is, the special sciences) are defined, exceeds the boundaries 
of any specific special science. The question what science as such 
is (and in any particular instance) therefore precedes the differen-
tiation and specialisation of all the academic disciplines – for that 
reason it belongs to the discipline of philosophy which has the task 
of investigating foundational questions such as these. 
Suppose we change the above-mentioned question and ask: Who 
can tell us what a plant is? Is a botanist not best qualified to answer 
this new question? The problem then is that one cannot account for 
the first person who started to investigate plants in a scientific way, 
for at that stage no botanist was available to tell us what a plant is! 
In other words, without the prior ability to distinguish between 
material things, plants and animals, no person would be able to start 
the study of plants, for in practical terms one may just as well end up 
studying physical entities or animals believing that they are plants. 
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The sole and ultimate basis for identifying plants as plants is there-
fore given in our pre-scientific experience of different kinds of enti-
ties, reflecting the diversity within reality. Of course plant scientists 
can deepen and enrich our pre-scientific knowledge, but it can never 
replace it. 
2.2 The many-sidedness of living entities 
Since plants, animals and human beings are all living entities, bio-
logists are assumed to be able to explain what “life” is, particularly 
because it is a wide-spread practice among them to speak of “life” 
as something concrete, for example when they discuss the “origin of 
life”. Of course the cell is the smallest living entity known (viruses 
are dependent upon cells and are therefore, strictly speaking, not 
alive in the full sense of the term). 
Let us approach this problem by first asking whether any living thing 
is fully alive – alive in its totality and in all it parts. This question 
presupposes the possibility to specify what are to be considered as 
genuine parts of a living entity which, in turn, presupposes an insight 
into the nature of the whole-parts relationship. In order to account for 
the latter, however, an account is required of two related issues: the 
difference between aspects (functions, modalities) and entities; and 
the inter-connections between various aspects (and entities). 
All entities are many-sided or multi-aspectual, in the sense that their 
existence is never exhausted by any one of their modal functions 
only. For example, although material entities are currently under-
stood as physical entities, they also simultaneously function within 
the aspects of number, space, and movement.3 Modal or aspectual 
laws hold universally for all possible kinds of entities, whereas any 
specific type of entity solely conforms to a specified type of law 
merely applicable to a limited class of entities. The type law for an 
atom is specified because it holds for atoms only (and not everything 
                                      
3 The history of the concept of matter shows how attempts were made to 
characterise material entities in numerical terms (“everything is number” – the 
Pythagoreans), in spatial terms (extension remained the essential property of 
material entities up to Descartes and Kant), in kinematic terms (the main 
tendency of classical physics is mechanistic – with Heinrich Hertz as its last, late 
nineteenth century, prominent representative). A detailed analysis of this 
development is found in Strauss (2006). 
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is an atom), but it still displays (a specified) universality, because it 
holds for all atoms.4 
Since the modal-functional meaning of space reflects its core mean-
ing in continuous extension it follows that the continuity of a spatial 
subject (such as a straight line) entails that every part is connected 
to every other part – that its parts cohere. When all its parts are 
present the whole is given. For this reason continuity is synonymous 
with being-connected, with what is coherent and with the relation be-
tween a whole and its parts. Therefore the whole-parts relation has 
its original seat within the spatial aspect. Both physical space and 
mathematical space are extended – the similarity between them. 
However, notwithstanding this similarity, there are also differences, 
for whereas the original meaning of spatial extension entails that it is 
both continuous and infinitely divisible, physical space is neither 
continuous, nor infinitely divisible (because it is bound to the quan-
tum structure of energy (cf. Hilbert, 1925:164). When two aspects 
are similar in the respect in which they differ, we meet an analogy. 
Therefore physical extension analogically refers back to spatial ex-
tension. A spatial whole is homogenous – every part is of the same 
nature. Even in the case of physical entities, their parts may be 
similar, as observed from the fact that a part of salt is still salt (with a 
NaCl chemical structure). A biotical whole is heterogenous, for al-
though a part of a horse is a “horse-part”, it is, nonetheless, not a 
horse (cf. Oeing-Hanoff, 1976:306).5 Although the different organs 
of a horse differ among themselves and from similar organs found in 
other animals, they nonetheless all share the same biotic property of 
being (part-) organs of a horse. This feature therefore represents, 
within the heterogenous biotic whole-parts relation, an element of 
homogeneity. 
In terms of the question regarding the true parts of a living entity, it is 
clear that the living organism of a living entity indeed evinces such 
an organic whole-parts relation.6 Holistic approaches employ the 
                                      
4 We shall return to Darwin and neo-Darwinism which accept universal modal 
(physical) laws, but deny biotical type laws. 
5 It must be acknowledged, however, that from a biotic perspective, the different 
organs of a horse all exhibit the organic feature of being integrated in the living 
organism of the horse. For this reason, the heart of a horse differs from that of a 
cow. 
6 Note that if the whole-parts relation has its original seat within the aspect of 
space (cf. Strauss, 2009:60-61, 224-226), and if the living organism of living 
entities displays a whole-parts relation, then an organic whole-parts relation also 
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idea of integrated organic parts in this regard, designated in German 
as Glieder (Afrikaans: geledinge). The reason for making a distinc-
tion between die living organism of a living entity and the entity itself 
is that within a living entity one also finds its non-living building 
blocks – atoms, molecules and macro-molecules. 
Nonetheless, this does not exhaust the complexity of what is at 
stake, because every organ of a living entity is constituted by a com-
plex arrangement of atoms, molecules and macro-molecules – and 
the latter certainly are not alive. The neo-Darwinian paleontologist, 
Simpson, correctly holds that, since molecules are not alive, the 
expression “molecular biology” is actually self-contradictory (Simp-
son, 1969:6). A discipline such as biochemistry does not fall into the 
same pitfall, because it focuses on the chemical (molecular) basis of 
the biotic functions of living entities without implicitly claiming that 
molecules as such are alive. 
Therefore, it cannot be denied that, within living things, non-living 
entities are also present, namely atoms, molecules and macro-
molecules. The conclusion is inevitable: a living entity appears to be 
at once a “mixture” of the “living” (its organs) and the “non-living” (its 
molecular basis). In other words, it is not alive through-and-through 
– it seems to be “alive” and “non-living” at the same time – thus 
demonstrating that the reifying mode of speech, referring to “life” as 
if it is an independent entity, is untenable.  
The predominant (neo-)Darwinian tradition in modern biology, has a 
physicalist inclination that opts for a view in which the biotic side of 
living entities is completely reduced to the interaction between 
atoms, molecules and macro-molecules. Vitalistic, holistic and orga-
nismic approaches, by contrast, do acknowledge what is sometimes 
referred to as the irreducibility of “life” – without realising, however, 
that this is still a reifying mode of speech, talking about “life” as if it is 
a thing, instead of merely being one among many aspects of living 
entities. Let us briefly examine the multi-aspectual nature of living 
things. Although atoms, molecules and macro-molecules as such 
are not alive, it is mistaken to claim that they are “dead”. The qua-
lification dead only applies to things that were alive – thus eliminat-
ing both expressions: “living matter” and “dead matter”! The German 
physicist, Von Weizsäcker (1993:32) is therefore fully justified in in-
                                                                                                             
analogically reflects the spatial whole-parts relation. The continuity of an 
extended spatial figure – such as a straight line – is connected in all its parts, 
but if all the cohering parts are present then we have the whole of the line. 
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troducing the new term unbelebt, designating that which is not, and 
has never been alive. 
Let us now briefly mention the active (or: subject) functions of living 
entities within the first four aspects of reality. No one can deny the 
unity (“oneness”) of living things – the unity in the multiplicity of their 
organic functioning. The phrase “organic functioning” entails the 
existence of a multiplicity of organic activities. In our everyday expe-
rience, this is intimately connected to an awareness of the intact 
nature of a living entity, its biotic wholeness, serving as a precondi-
tion for its continued processes of life (generally growing, i.e. diffe-
rentiation and integration), maturation, ageing and dying. Therefore 
living entities indeed also occupy space, display movement and 
function thermodynamically as open systems – and all these func-
tions are guided by their qualifying biotic function.7 What is indeed 
remarkable is that a living entity like the cell, not merely functions in 
a unique entitary way within the physical aspect of reality. Karl 
Trincher (1985:336) identified four “macroscopic”8 characteristics 
from which the physical uniqueness of a living cell is evident, which 
include the following: 
• spatial macroscopy, which defines the cell as a spatially delimi-
ted surface; 
• temporal macroscopy, which determines the finite time in which 
the energy cycle of the cell occurs; 
• the isothermal nature of the cell, which is responsible for the con-
stancy of temperature throughout the cell; and 
• the persistent positive difference between the higher internal 
temperature of the cell and the lower external temperature of the 
environment adjacent to the cell surface. 
                                      
7 In terms of thermodynamically open systems, any living entity, from a physical 
perspective, prevails in a state of high statistical improbability. This physical 
instability is a precondition for the biotical stability of such entities, captured by 
saying that they are healthy. Biotic stability presupposes physical instability and 
physical stability implies biotic instability (a sign that death is on its way!). The 
neo-vitalist biologists who succeeded Hans Driesch, in particular Schubert-
Soldern, introduced the phrase “instability factor” as substitute for Hans 
Driesch’s entelechie (cf. Schubert-Soldern, 1959:62, 68; 1962:102 ff.). 
8 Note that Trincher employs the term macroscopic in the sense or “overall” (the 
opposite of “restricted to some or other part”) and not in the sense of large (as 
opposed to small). 
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As an aspect of reality, life therefore pertains to the how of entities 
and not to their concrete what. Just like physical entities, the exis-
tence of biotic entities also is never enclosed in any single aspect, 
not even within their qualifying biotic aspect. Particularly in the vita-
list tradition – which sees life as independent variations of an imma-
terial vital force – this becomes a problem. That the biotic aspect of 
living entities cannot be seen on its own, i.e. separated from the 
inter-modal coherence in which it is fitted, is confirmed by the 
analogies intrinsic to the structure of the biotic aspect. Even the ex-
pression life force (vital force), which is so often chosen by vitalism 
(but remarkably enough, has been replaced with other terms like 
Gestaltungsfaktor or Zentralinstanz in the second half of the twen-
tieth century), can never indicate or typify the alleged separated 
existence of the biotic aspect – simply because it unmistakably 
represents a physical analogy within the modal structure of the biotic 
aspect. The term force finds its original, i.e. non-analogical, modal 
seat in the physical aspect of energy operation. 
From the preceding remarks, we can deduce that the term life refers 
to the unique core meaning of the biotic aspect of reality. Particularly 
physicalist materialism does not acknowledge the uniqueness of the 
biotic aspect. The original version of Darwin’s book, published in 
1859, certainly does not advance a truly biological theory at all. It ac-
knowledges only (physical) “laws of nature” but nowhere speaks of 
any biotical laws of nature. Its main emphasis is on change, at the 
cost of constancy (cf. Strauss, 2007). 
Through his 1859 work Charles Darwin undoubtedly irrevocably 
changed the face of modern biology. Before he published it, biolo-
gical thought was largely dominated by the Platonic idea that living 
things are mere copies of unchanging, static, eternal (super-sen-
sory) ideal forms, as well as the vitalistic Aristotelian tradition, with 
its emphasis on purposefulness (finality/teleology). The biological 
systematic classification of Ray (1627-1705) and Linnaeus (1707-
1778) continued the Platonic legacy and it captured the minds of 
biologists up to the present, for representatives of idealistic morpho-
logy are also found in the twentieth century. These include Dacqué 
(cf. 1935; 1940; 1948), Troll (1951; 1973), Wolf (1951), Leinfeller 
(1966) and Heitler (1976). Troll’s work of 1973 is a standard (more 
than 1 000 page) botany textbook. According to Troll, the foundation 
of comparative morphology is to be found in ideas (in the platonic 
sense), which serve to order the “inner articulations of our intuition” 
by means of which types as Urbildliche Einheiten (primordial image-
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like units) become the subject matter of biology (cf. Ungerer, 1966: 
232). 
3. The physicalism of Darwin’s 1859 work 
During the past 150 years, diverse trends of thought emerged within 
biology – constantly introducing alternative modes of explanation. 
The brief overview given below broadens the perspective on neo-
Darwinism amidst different biological trends of thought. 
Consider the mechanistic orientation (Eisenstein, 1975a), the physi-
calistic approach (neo-Darwinism), neo-vitalism (Driesch, 1929; Sin-
nott, 1963; 1972; Schubert-Soldern, 1959; 1962; Haas, 1959; 1968; 
Heitler, 1976); holism (Meyer, 1964; 1965); emergence evolutionism 
(C. Lloyd-Morgan, Richard Woltereck, Bernard Bavink, 1954; Polan-
yi, 1967; 1968; 1969); the organismic biology of Von Bertalanffy 
(1973); and pan-psychism (De Chardin [cf. Duyvené de Wit, 1962], 
Rensch, 1959; 1968; 1969; 1971, 1973); recent complexity theory 
(Behe’s notion of “irreducibly complex systems” – cf. Behe, 2003) 
and the idea of “intelligent design” that surfaced more recently – not 
on the basis of insufficient factual knowledge, but supported by 
scholars with highly specialised natural scientific competencies (cf. 
Dekker et al., 2006). 
For the mechanistic (physicalistic) approach, everything is material 
in principle, and physically determined, which implies that any terms 
that appeal to the actual biotic aspect of living things are pro-
blematic. Conversely, vitalism searches for immaterial life plans – 
currently designated as reflecting an intelligent design – in order to 
account for the actual nature of “life”. These life plans are some-
times designated as formative factors or central instances. It also 
makes it difficult to speak of “living matter” from the perspective of 
this approach – a problem that a vitalistic biologist like Haas admits 
with his emphasis on the fact that physical substances maintain their 
“being and working” “subsequent to their assimilation” in living 
things. Understandably, therefore, Haas is also critical of the habit of 
speaking of “living matter” – according to him, the biochemists and 
cell physiologists do not know of any “living matter” with “secret vital 
characteristics” (Haas, 1968:24). He prefers to speak of the material 
substratum of organisms (Haas, 1968:20-40). 
This approach rejects what Haas sees as Aristotle’s “monistic vita-
lism” – and at the same time he draws conclusions about his own 
approach:  
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Organisms therefore consist essentially of two realities which 
are distinguished from each other, a material and a non-
material component; it consequently possesses, viewed onto-
logically, a dualistic constitution (Haas, 1968:39). 
4. The quest for origins 
It appears that intrinsic to human thinking is an urge towards what is 
considered to be ultimate, in the sense of unconditional and inde-
pendent existence – upon which whatever else there may be de-
pends (cf. Clouser, 2005:35-41). 
Overestimating human intellectual abilities is almost as old as hu-
mankind itself. Contemporary physics (cosmology) pretends to 
account for “creation” whereas in fact it theorises over a presumed 
unique event lying at the boundaries of our (physical experience). 
The “Big Bang” is sometimes portrayed as departing from a primor-
dial initial hot and condensed condition that precedes time and 
space. In some respects the mode of speech attached to the Big 
Bang hypothesis closely imitate the theological tradition of a nega-
tive theology – where one cannot say what God is like, but only state 
what God is not. Of course in all instances of a negative theology 
one always finds one or another last remnant of a positive charac-
terisation. In the case of the Big Bang it is therefore not surprising 
that size and heat play a crucial role – think about terms such as 
density and temperature. Hubble and Lemaître contributed to the 
idea of the expanding universe. The equations formulated by Alex-
ander Friedmann are based upon Einstein’s General theory of rela-
tivity and they presuppose the conditioning role of the first four as-
pects of reality – number, space, the kinematic and the physical. 
However, Gentry questions the expansion postulate, arguing that 
“the universe is relativistically formatted in accordance with the 
Schwartzschild static spacetime solution of the field equations, not 
the Friedmann-Lemaître spacetime” (cf. Gentry, 2001:1). 
Whatever the outcome of this controversy may be, it cannot qualify 
as an account of creation. Dating this primordial event to almost 14 
billion years ago appeals to time measurement and time measure-
ment always involves the duration of a process. Any time duration is 
always delimited by and subject to a specific (correlated) time order. 
The history of time measurement reveals a general awareness of 
four modes of time: earlier and later, simultaneity, time-flow and ir-
reversibility are well-known modalities of time. In his work on the 
foundations of physics, Stafleu (1980:16) remarks: 
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This is most clearly shown by an analysis of the historical 
development of time measurement. Initially, time measurement 
was simply done by counting (days, months, years, etc.). Later 
on, time was measured by the relative position of the sun or the 
stars in the sky, with or without the help of instruments like the 
sundial. In still more advanced cultures, time was measured by 
utilizing the regular motion of more or less complicated clock-
works. Finally, in recent developments time is measured via 
irreversible processes, for example, in atomic clocks. 
What is striking in this whole development is that different time or-
ders are used, the one after the other: the numerical time order of 
succession, the spatial order of simultaneity, the kinematic time or-
der of constancy and the irreversible physical time order, expressed 
in the relationship of cause and effect. 
Both Vollenhoven (cf. Tol, 1995:99 ff.) and Van Riessen (1970:113, 
186) adhere to the view that time implies change. However, the (ori-
ginal) physical meaning of change refers to the meaning of those 
aspects that are foundational to the physical aspect. In fact change 
can only be detected on the basis of constancy, and therefore en-
durance (persistence or constancy) is not only inherent in our a-
wareness of time, for it forms an indispensible condition for change. 
Constancy and change are on an equal footing, similar to succes-
sion and simultaneity. As soon as the meaning of (physical) change 
is analysed, its dependence upon these three foundational modes of 
time is evident, because change presupposes (the modal meaning 
of) constancy, simultaneity and succession. 
These distinctions are supported by the account of Paul Lorenzen 
regarding the four units of measurement used in physics, reflecting 
the first four modes of explanation: mass, length, duration and 
charge (cf. Lorenzen, 1976:1 ff.). It is noteworthy to mention that 
Heisenberg, accepting two universal constants (Einstein’s postulate 
of the velocity of light and Planck’s quantum of action), was looking 
for a third universal constant, namely a universal length. He claims 
that one has to have at least three units – be they length, time and 
mass or replaced by length, velocity and mass or even length, 
velocity and energy (Heisenberg, 1958:165). An analysis of the first 
four modal aspects would have helped him to realise that four are 
needed. Clearly these four units of measurement reflect the mean-
ing of the first four aspects of reality, namely number (“mass”), 
space (“length”), the kinematical aspect (“duration”) and the physical 
aspect (“charge”). Weinert (1998:230) mentions even that usually 
physicists “distinguish fundamental constants from conventional 
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units” – and he then lists the kilogramme (number),9 the meter 
(space), the second (the kinematic) and temperature (the physical) 
(cf. also Lorenzen, 1989). 
Since one or another time order is presupposed in every unit of 
measurement or any actual measurement, the coming into being of 
the time order concerned can never be measured – explaining why 
creation in principle cannot be dated! The order diversity within crea-
tion ultimately points at an understanding transcending conceptual 
knowledge – it can solely be approximated in an idea of creation.10 
5. Striking shortcomings in the thought of Darwin and his 
followers 
At the time when Darwin’s 1859 work appeared, virtually nothing 
was known about the complexities of the smallest unit capable of 
independent life, the cell. However, during the last 60 years various 
natural scientific disciplines succeeded in unravelling the most asto-
nishing detail in this regard. The stunning complexity of the picture 
that emerged, caused many biologists to express their wonder and 
awe11 for this microworld and to question the leap of faith present in 
neo-Darwinian circles regarding the accidental origination of the first 
living entity.  
Both Darwin and neo-Darwinism proceed on the basis of a mate-
rialistic understanding of nature. Within the context of the contempo-
rary philosophy of science, materialism is seen as physicalistic:  
Physicalism denotes what used to be called materialism, the 
view that the universe is ultimately an entirely physical system. 
… Ultimately there are no phenomena in the universe which 
                                      
9 The Latin designation of mass during the medieval period was “quantitas 
materiae” (cf. Maier, 1949:144). The kilogram, in its reference to mass, is 
specified by assigning a (physical) number to it – and what is assigned is the 
numerical measure of the physical quantity (i.e. mass) concerned. 
10 This epistemological distinction between conceptual knowledge and concept 
transcending knowledge has important implications for questions of origins. 
11 After Francis Collins, a longtime leader of the Human Genome Project, 
described the relation between DNA, RNA and proteins. He remarks “[T]his brief 
description only scratches the surface of the elegance of DNA, RNA and 
protein, which continues to be a source of awe and wonder” (Collins, 2007:104). 
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cannot be understood in terms of the concepts of physics. 
(Klee, 1997:99.) 12  
Within the domain of physics (and the material world) Darwin con-
tinued to subscribe to universal (and constant) natural laws, but as 
soon as living entities enter the scene Darwinists deny any typicality 
and they do not accept the existence of biotic laws. Darwin does 
speak of a “general law of nature” (Darwin, 1859a:143) and of “a 
universal law of nature” (Darwin, 1859a:268; cf. also Darwin, 
1859a:143, 147, 427, 445). – but he never speaks of biotical laws of 
nature – even if biotic phenomena are at stake. For him physical 
laws (or: natural laws) are sufficient – his underlying physicalism that 
dominates his entire work On the origin of species (cf. Strauss, 
2007). 
Biological thinking preceding the Origin of species is embodied, as 
we mentioned, in the tradition of (a vitalistic and) idealistic morpho-
logy – from Aristotle up to neo-vitalism of Driesch and his followers. 
This orientation was accompanied by the idea of a (supposedly) 
immaterial vital force (entelechie). Since theory formation always ex-
plores certain modes of explanation, the effect of elevating one 
mode of explanation normally results in a monistic theoretical orien-
tation.  
Darwin rather opted for the idea that living entities are intrinsically 
changeful and subject to chance processes. His eventual accept-
ance of the principle of uniformitarianism (derived from his acquaint-
ance with Lyell’s work in the field of geology), however, continued a 
feature formally similar to an element of idealistic morphology. 
Between 1831 and 1836, on his world tour, Darwin discovered ani-
mal fossils in South America and discerned similarities with varia-
tions of living plants and animals found on the Galapagos Islands. In 
his 1859 work Darwin developed his view of the (incremental) total 
process of becoming (change) stretching over millions of years – 
                                      
12 Note that physicalism over-emphasises the physical mode of explanation. The 
positivist, Neurath, prefers to speak of the “Vienna Circle for Physicalism” and 
advances the idea of “the unified language of physicalism” (Neurath, 1959:282, 
285). We shall return to the following statement of Van Huyssteen which in 
principle does not differ from the way in which Klee defined physicalism. Van 
Huyssteen says that we have to “take very seriously the general conclusions 
and findings of general cosmology” – “that is that this universe is evolving, that 
all that is within it has had a common physical origin in time, and that all it 
contains is in principle explicable by the natural sciences” (Van Huyssteen, 
1998:75). 
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giving rise (through differentiation or speciation) to the rich variety of 
species we know today. Adaptation is the mechanism through which 
living things survive, and Darwin characterises the overall process 
as controlled by natural selection. 
6. Darwin’s nominalism 
In respect of the typical structure of entities, nominalism does not 
accept any conditioning order (universal structures for), or any or-
derliness (universal structuredness) of such entities. Every entity is 
strictly individual. In terms of the distinction between rationalism 
(reifying what is universal) and irrationalism (reifying what is in-
dividual), nominalism surely represents an irrationalistic view in con-
nection with the nature of entities, since every individual entity is 
completely stripped from its universal orderliness (law-conformity) 
and conditioning order. This characteristic applies to both moderate 
nominalism, viz. conceptualism (Locke, Ockham, Leibniz and ot-
hers), and to extreme nominalism, that rejects all general and ab-
stract ideas and accepts only general names (Berkeley and Bren-
tano). 
This irrationalistic side of nominalism, however, does not exhaust its 
multifaceted nature because universals are fully acknowledged with-
in the human mind, at least as general words in the case of 
Berkeley’s and Brentano’s extreme nominalism. This restriction of 
knowledge to universals is typical of rationalism in the sense defined 
by us. Therefore, it is possible to see nominalism as being simul-
taneously rationalistic (in terms of the universals – concepts and 
words – in one’s mind), and irrationalistic (in terms of the strict indivi-
duality of entities). 
6.1 The common root of diverging trends in modern 
philosophy 
This dual nature of nominalism forms the starting point of two diverg-
ing philosophical developments in modern philosophy. 
• On the one hand, it provided rationalism with the possibility to 
elevate human reason to the level of the creator of a rational or-
der in reality. This follows from the fact that nominalism in fact 
transposes the universal side of entities into the human mind. 
The universal side of entities is, however, nothing but the mani-
festation of the conditionedness of entities by the relevant univer-
sal order for their existence. Consequently, if an entity is stripped 
of its orderliness (its universal side), it is simultaneously stripped 
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of its being subjected to a universal creational order. What is left 
is factual reality in its unstructured, chaotic individuality and par-
ticularity (contingency) (cf. Rauche, 1966:97). Driven by the new 
motive of logical creation, this very feature of nominalism en-
abled modern philosophy from Descartes onwards to reconstruct 
all of reality in terms of natural scientific thought. Only the 
extreme consequences of this natural science-ideal, cancelling in 
principle also human freedom, were questioned by Kant. Within 
the (limited) domain of the science-ideal, however, Kant draws 
the ultimate rationalistic conclusion of nominalism. Indeed, Kant 
tries to consolidate and strengthen the preceding natural 
science-ideal, be it in the restricted form of the rationalistically 
elevated understanding which (though limited to sensibility in 
order to save a separate super-sensory domain for the practical-
ethical freedom of autonomous humanity), is considered to be 
the a priori (formal) law-giver of nature! Nominalism created a 
vacuum by leaving factual reality in its individuality unstructured. 
In order to fill up the lack of determination thus created, Kant 
introduces human understanding to take hold of this vacant posi-
tion. To be sure, Kant not merely transposes the universal side of 
entities into human understanding, since he, in fact, elevates 
human understanding to the level of the conditioning order for 
things. 
Kant advanced the radical humanistic conclusion: the laws of na-
ture are a priori contained in the subjective understanding of the 
human being: “the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience, and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of ex-
perience” (Kant, 1787-B:161).13 Human understanding is thus 
promoted to become the (a priori) formal law-giver of nature in a 
universally valid way. 
• On the other hand, nominalism provided a starting point for all 
those trends in modern philosophy which, in an irrationalistic 
fashion, want to take the unique and contingent character of 
(mostly designated as: historical) reality serious. This avenue ex-
plored by nominalism was followed up by a variety of historicistic 
designs in modern philosophy, for example from the fourth phase 
of Fichte’s thought up to pragmatism, existentialism, contempo-
                                      
13 “Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and 
therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances” (Kant, 1787:163); “Under-
standing creates its laws (a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to 
nature” (Kant, 1783:320; § 36). 
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rary neo-Marxism and postmodernism. If reality is tripped both of 
its orderliness and of its being subjected to a conditioning univer-
sal creational order, it seems to be a “self-evident historicistic 
truth” that, ultimately, everything is historical and therefore taken 
up in the dynamic and ever-changing contingent flow of historical 
events. 
At this point we can link up the influence of nominalism with neo-
Darwinistic evolutionism. The remark of Simpson, namely that plants 
and animals are not types and do not have types, since everyone of 
them is unique (Simpson, 1969:8-9), is a fully-fledged nominalistic 
conviction. The genesis of plants, animals and human beings are 
taken up in a structureless continuum. Systematic distinctions, ex-
emplified in different taxonomies, are nothing but arbitrary names 
(nomina) given to an immense number of individually different living 
entities. The universality implied in these names is a product of our 
constitutive human understanding without any foundation in the 
“things outside the mind”. Already Charles Darwin adhered explicitly 
to this view in his Origin of species.14 
Remark:  
Contemporary biologists still struggle with the dilemma of continuity 
and discontinuity. The neo-Darwinian geneticist Coyne, for example, 
designates a discrete cluster of sexually reproducing organisms as a 
species. He (Coyne, 2009:184) says:  
And at first sight, their existence looks like a problem for 
evolutionary theory. Evolution is, after all, a continuous process, 
so how can it produce groups of animals and plants that are 
discrete and discontinuous, separated from others by gaps in 
appearance and behavior?  
This acknowledgment of discreteness is irreconcilable with the no-
tion of evolutionary continuity – unless one subscribes to the intrin-
sically antinomic stance of emergence evolutionism. The latter idea 
fits the spirit of the irrationalistic leg of nominalism, rejecting any 
                                      
14 In the Penguin edition of the Origin of species Darwin’s nominalism is explicit:  
No one can draw any clear distinction between individual differences 
and slight varieties; or between more plainly marked varieties and 
subspecies, and species. … In short, we shall have to treat species in 
the same manner as those naturalists treat genera, who admit that 
genera are merely artificial combinations made up for convenience. 
This may not be a cheering prospect; but we shall at least be freed 
from the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable 
essence of the term species. (Darwin, 1859a:443, 456.) 
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structural or typical feature belonging to “reality out there”. However, 
faithful to the inherent inconsistency of nominalism (being rationa-
listic and irrationalistic at the same time), Coyne, at once, also wants 
to defend the objective reality of species: “yet we know that species 
have an objective reality and are not simply arbitrary human con-
structs” (Coyne, 2009:186). From what is asserted on the previous 
page, it is clear that in the thought of Coyne primacy is given to the 
irrationalistic side of nominalism, because it is the continuous 
process of evolution that produces discrete groups: “For years after 
publication of The Origin, biologists struggled, and failed, to explain 
how a continuous process of evolution produces the discrete groups 
known as species.” 
Of course the irrationalistic side of this nominalistic legacy in the 
thought of Darwin contradicts his (rationalistic) acceptance of 
“universal laws of nature”. Earlier we noted that he accepted Leyll’s 
view of invariant natural laws, his uniformitarianism; but at the same 
time, owing to their tendency towards change, living entities are con-
sidered to be without constant structures – an outcome of Darwin’s 
irrationalist (nominalistic) understanding of living entities. Nomina-
lism provides a starting point both for modern historicism (with its 
emphasis on change) and for Darwin’s adherence to a nominalistic 
view of living entities.  
6.2 Progress and incremental change – the assumed 
origination of first living entities 
It is indeed a matter of consistently thinking through Darwin’s nomi-
nalism that Gould (1996), in the light of the fossil record, claims that 
the basic theory of natural selection offers no statement regarding 
general progress and therefore does not supply a mechanism in 
terms of which an overall advance might be expected. Gould (1996: 
136) writes: 
The problem that spawns this confusion within the Darwinian 
tradition may be simply stated as a paradox. The basic theory 
of natural selection offers no statement about general progress, 
and supplies no mechanism whereby overall advance might be 
expected. Yet both Western culture and the undeniable facts of 
a fossil record that started with bacteria alone, and has now 
exalted us, cry out in unison for a rationale that will place 
progress into the center of evolutionary theory. 
The basic unsolved problem for Darwin and neo-Darwinism is found 
in the total absence of any theory or experiment that accounts for 
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the (assumed) transition from the non-living to the living. Darwin’s 
strong belief in an incremental, continuous process inspired natural 
scientists already in the first half of the twentieth century to generate 
a rational account of this assumed transition. Great expectations 
were derived from what Haldane and Oparin (cf. Oparin, 1953, 
chapters 4-7:64-195) conjectured (Haldane, already in 1928). It was 
during this period, the twenties and thirties of the previous century, 
that the so-called “New synthesis ” emerged – with names such as 
Julian Huxley in 1942 (Evolution: the modern synthesis), R.A. Fish-
er, Theodosius Dobzhansky, J.B.S. Haldane, Sewall Wright, E.B. 
Ford, Ernst Mayr, Bernhard Rensch, Sergei Chetverikov, George 
Gaylord Simpson, and G. Ledyard Stebbins associated with it. 
What became known as the Oparin-Haldane hypothesis kept the 
hope alive that it will indeed soon be possible to reconstruct the 
origination of the first living entity (cell, bacteria). During the fifties 
Miller and his colleagues designed some experiments based upon 
specific assumptions regarding the conditions on earth long ago. In 
particular it was assumed that the initial atmosphere of the earth 
was mainly composed of hydrogen, methane, ammonia and water 
vapor. Oparin believed that carbon “made its first appearance on the 
Earth’s surface not in the oxidized form of carbon dioxide but, on the 
contrary, in the reduced state, in the form of hydrocarbons” (Oparin, 
1953:101-102). 
The progress made in our understanding of the molecular and 
biochemical basis of the living cell from this foundational perspective 
revealed that living entities can only function on the basis of both 
DNA and proteins. The complexities involved in the structural com-
position of both are so immense that it is difficult enough to con-
jecture that any one of the two originated independently and spon-
taneously.15 To complicate matters further it is clear that both had to 
come into being simultaneously for DNA without proteins cannot 
function and proteins without DNA cannot come into existence. At 
one of the international conferences on pre-biotic (a-biotic) “evolu-
tion” Orgel and Sulston (1971) reported on their attempt to explain 
                                      
15 The issue is indeed the “information”. The chance of randomly selecting the 
letters in a specific order (at 5 000 flips per second) of one page of the genetic 
code, is calculated to take ten billion years. Since there are actually 500 000 
such pages, it will take nothing less than five million billion years to “assemble” 
all of them in their correct arrangement. (Keep in mind that present-day 
physicists and astronomers estimate our own universe to be less than fourteen 
billion years old.) 
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the concurrent emergence of DNA and protein. However, their report 
contains something strange. In the first place they stated: “This ap-
proach leads to new difficulties so severe that it has never been 
carried very far” (Orgel & Sulston, 1971:91). Then they continue 
about what they considered to be progress. According to them pro-
gress was only made when characteristics are attributed to protein 
and DNA “which have not been demonstrated experimentally, and 
which usually seem implausible” (Orgel & Sulston, 1971:91). Isn’t it 
amazing that what seems to be implausible and has never been 
demonstrated experimentally are appreciated as progress? 
It should therefore not surprise anyone that the imaginative attempts 
to account for the emergence of the first living entity ran stuck in 
insurmountable difficulties. Almost three decades later Silver (1998) 
points out that there is at present “no evidence that the atmosphere 
was reducing (methane and hydrogen)” and remarks that “the pre-
valent opinion at the moment is that the Earth’s atmosphere, at the 
time that life emerged, was mainly carbon dioxide and nitrogen” (Sil-
ver, 1998:344). The role of methane is also unacceptable in the 
Oparin-story since it is one of the components of natural gas which 
is produced by the “effect of millions of years of pressure and heat 
acting on prehistoric plant material” (Silver, 1998:344). Although the 
Haldane-Oparin conjecture was kept alive for a considerable time, 
supported by the mentioned experiments done by Stanley Miller 
(from Chicago) in 1953, it does not bring us closer to an understand-
ing of the mystery of the genesis of the living cell.16 
In the same year in which Silver articulated his concerns, Orgel had 
to concede:  
                                      
16 The Haldane-Oparin hypothesis is out of fashion. Of the forty or so simple 
molecules that would be needed to form a primitive cell, the experiment 
produces two. It is worth bearing in mind that glycine contains only ten atoms 
and alanine, thirteen. The simplest nucleotide contains thirty atoms. The 
probability that a given large molecule will be produced by chance from small 
molecules, by sparks, falls drasticcally as the molecular size increases. It 
has to be realised that even if heat, radiation, and lightning, on the young 
Earth, had produced all the amino acids and nucleotides needed for present 
forms of life, the gap between an aqueous solution of these molecules and a 
living cell is stupendous. It’s a question of organisation: in the absence of a 
guiding intelligence, present-day scientists are not doing very well. For the 
moment, let’s show the Miller experiment to the side door and see who is 
next in line in the waiting room. (Silver, 1998:345.) 
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There are several tenable theories about the origin of organic 
material 17 on the primitive earth, but in no case is the sup-
porting evidence compelling. Similarly, several alternative 
scenarios might account for the self-organization of a self-
replicating entity from prebiotic organic material, but all of those 
that are well formulated are based on hypothetical chemical 
syntheses that are problematic. (Orgel quoted by Lennox, 
2007:125-126.)  
Lennox then also quotes an earlier statement made by Klaus Dose: 
More than thirty years of experimentation on the origin of life in 
the fields of chemical and molecular evolution have led to a 
better perception of the immensity of the problem of the origin 
of life on earth rather than to its solution. At present all 
discussions on principal theories and experiments in the field 
either end in stalemate or in a confession of ignorance. (Len-
nox, 2007:126.) 
Behe (2003b:169-170) also remarks: 
Of course, if conditions on the ancient earth actually resembled 
Miller’s unsuccessful attempts, then in reality no amino acids 
would have been produced. Moreover, joining many amino 
acids together to form a protein with a useful biological activity 
is a much more difficult chemical problem than forming amino 
acids in the first place. The major problem in hooking amino 
acids together is that, chemically, it involves the removal of a 
molecule of water for each amino acid joined to the growing 
protein chain. Conversely, the presence of water strongly in-
hibits amino acids from forming proteins. Because water is so 
abundant on the earth, and because amino acids dissolve 
readily in water, origin-of life researchers have been forced to 
propose unusual scenarios to get around the water problem. 
Mills and his co-authors give an overview over key issues in respect 
of Origin of life hypotheses. They mention a number of difficulties 
and distortions. For example, the assumption that the early atmos-
phere had no oxygen – important for simulation experiments – runs 
stuck in the fact that “there is no proof that oxygen was absent from 
that atmosphere” (Mills et al., 2003:209). It occurs that when the 
formation of proteins from amino acids is contemplated nothing is 
                                      
17 Note the significant modesty that entered the scene – the aim is no longer to 
design a theory regarding the emergence of the first living entity, the only 
concern is the “origin” of “organic material”. 
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mentioned of the fact that amino acids only link when they are 
heated in the dry state (they do not link spontaneously in an 
aqueous solution – and the assumption is that the early earth con-
tained a lot of water). Moreover, what these authors do not mention 
is that some of the linkages produced by the dry state are not found 
in proteins. What is even more disturbing is that these linkages 
would “prevent the formation of useful amino acid sequences” (Mills 
et al., 2003:210). 
In the absence of an understanding of the complexity of the micro-
dimensions of living entities, Darwin simply conjectured in a truly 
speculative fashion, that first living entities accidentally originated 
and that a similar process generated the eye.18 In his work on Dar-
win’s Black box, the biochemist Behe questions these assumptions 
in the light of our current knowledge. Regarding the eye it appears to 
be a hopeless task to provide an evolutionary explanation for its 
origination: 
Anatomy is, quite simply, irrelevant. So is the fossil record. It 
does not matter whether the fossil record is consistent with 
evolutionary theory, any more than it mattered in physics that 
Newton’s theory was consistent with everyday experience. The 
fossil record has nothing to tell us about, say, whether or how 
the interactions of 11-cis-retinal with rhodopsin, transducin, and 
phosphodiesterase could have developed, step by step. (Behe, 
2003b:292.) 
Those who have respect for scientific modesty may do well to reflect 
upon a remark made by Haldane in a discussion with Silver (1998: 
353):  
I had a long conversation with J.B.S. Haldane, which started off 
with politics and ended with science. When I questioned him 
about evolution, one of his remarks sparked my interest, and 
sent me to the library that evening: ‘Evolution’s not the problem. 
Life is.’ Then he said, ‘Oparin and I once had an idea about 
that, but we’ll never know the real answer’. 
Clearly, one of the co-founders of the “New synthesis”, Haldane, 
thus underscored that solving the problem of “evolution” is much 
easier than accounting for the presupposition underlying it – explain-
ing the difficulties regarding the origination of the first living entity. 
                                      
18 Although these processes are indeed different, their degree complexity is 
similar. 
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7. Darwin on the fossil record 
In Darwin’s thought the nominalistic preoccupation with change and 
continuity inspired the overall idea that living entities experienced 
slow alterations over vast periods of time. This assumption, in turn, 
caused paleontologists to believe that there are not only “numerous, 
fine, intermediate varieties” to be found, but also to view all fossil 
findings in advance in terms of incremental change. So-called “phy-
letic gradualism” embodies the nineteenth-century conception of 
Darwin, namely that species evolve incrementally at a more or less 
steady rate. He holds: 
Geological research … yet has done scarcely anything in 
breaking down the distinction between species, by connecting 
them together by numerous, fine, intermediate varieties; and 
this not having been affected, is probably the greatest and most 
obvious of all the many objections which may be urged against 
my views (Darwin, 1859a:307). 19 
The absence of intermediate fossil forms, unaltered after more than 
100 years, caused sufficient discomfort among neo-Darwinist pa-
leontologists. During the seventies of the previous century dissent-
ing voices among them started to emerge. Gould and Eldredge 
introduced their idea of punctuated equilibria and at the same time 
D.B. Kitts wrote a significant article in the neo-Darwinist journal 
Evolution. The title of this article is: Paleontology and evolutionary 
theory. In it Kitts points out that the spatial distribution and temporal 
sequence of organisms with which paleontology works is founded in 
the ordering principles of geology, and can therefore not be incor-
porated in any biological theory:  
Thus the paleontologist can provide knowledge that cannot be 
provided by biological principles alone. But he cannot provide 
us with evolution. We can leave the fossil record free of a 
theory of evolution. An evolutionist, however, cannot leave the 
fossil record free of the evolutionary hypothesis. (Kitts, 1974: 
466.) 20  
                                      
19 In 1859b this reads:  
What geological research has not revealed, is the former existence of 
infinitely numerous gradations, as fine as existing varieties, 
connecting together nearly all existing and extinct species. But this 
ought not to be expected; yet this has been repeatedly advanced as a 
most serious objection against my views. (Darwin, 1859b:207.) 
20 Also Thomson observes that, in the words of Mills et al., “factual patterns of 
change over time, particularly as seen in the fossil record, can be studied in the 
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He plainly states: “Evolution requires intermediate forms and paleon-
tology does not provide them” (Kitts, 1974:467).21  
The other side of this coin is that the fossil record is not at all do-
minated by Darwin’s preoccupation with change. Rather, as El-
dredge (of the American Museum of Natural History), notes, it is a 
fact that stasis or constancy dominates the “fossil record”.22 Gould 
points out that stasis is data.  
Eldredge and I became so frustrated by the failure of many 
colleagues to grasp this evident point … The fossil record may, 
after all, be 99 percent imperfect, but if you can, nonetheless, 
sample a species at a large number of horizons well spread 
over several million years, and if these samples record no net 
change, with beginning and end points substantially the same, 
…, then a conclusion of stasis rests on the presence of data, 
not on absence! … Stasis is data (Gould, 2002:759).  
Most species “enter the evolutionary order fully formed and then 
depart unchanged” (Berlinski, 2003:158). Eldredge adds the remark: 
“and this destroys the backbone of the most important argument of 
the modern theory of evolution” (Eldredge as quoted by Van den 
Beukel, 2006:106).23 
This situation clearly shows that the prejudiced and premature pre-
occupation by Darwin and his followers with change prevented 
modern (neo-)Darwinian biology to come to terms with the fact that 
change always presupposes something constant. The one-sided 
emphasis on change actually denied constancy its rightful place. 
What Gould and Eldredge designated as the dominant theme of the 
fossil record, namely stasis (non-change) highlights another impor-
                                                                                                             
absence of theories of how these patterns came to be” (quoted in Mills et al., 
2003:215). 
21 To this he adds the remark: “But most of the gaps are still there a century later 
and some paleontologists were no longer willing to explain them away geo-
logically.” (Kitts, 1974:467.) 
22 “Gould and I claimed that stasis (= immutability, stand-still), and not change, is 
the dominant theme of the fossil record” (quoted by Van den Beukel, 2006:106). 
23 Gould (1996:68) quotes Prothero and Shubin, who wrote in connection with the 
supposed evolution of the horse:  
This is contrary to the widely held myth about horse species as 
gradualistically varying parts of a continuum, with no real distinctions 
between species. Throughout the history of horses, the species are 
well-marked and static over millions of years. 
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tant viewpoint. On the one hand change presupposes the constancy 
of conditions (in the sense of a law that determines and delimits 
those entities subject to it), and on the other those subjects may 
display, notwithstanding variability within certain boundaries, a rela-
tive persistence (constancy or identity). The latter phenomenon is 
supported by the mentioned dominant theme.24 
Although Darwin was unable to give one single example of ancestral 
changes of species from the fossil record in 1859, he faithfully 
articulates the continuity postulate of modern philosophy when he 
says: 
If numerous species, belonging to the same genera or families, 
have really started into life at once, the fact would be fatal to the 
theory of evolution through natural selection. For the develop-
ment by this means of a group of forms, all of which are de-
scended from some one progenitor, must have been an 
extremely slow process; and the progenitors must have lived 
long before their modified descendants. (Darwin, 1859a:309.) 
Ironically enough this is exactly what happened during the “Cam-
brian explosion”. According to Sterelny the standard (neo-)Darwinian 
story runs “slap-bang into a nasty fact”, namely that most “major 
animal groups appeared simultaneously”, that is, at once, about 530 
million years ago. 
In the ‘Cambrian explosion’, we find segmented worms, velvet 
worms, starfish and their allies, mollusks (snails, squid and their 
relatives), sponges, bivalves and other shelled animals appear-
ing all at once, with their basic organization, organ systems, 
and sensory mechanisms already operational. We do not find 
crude prototypes of, say, starfish or trilobites. Moreover, we do 
not find common ancestors of these groups. (Sterelny, 2001:89-
90.) 
                                      
24 This issue is discussed in more detail in Strauss (2009). We just mention a few 
significant facts. The Coelacanth that was supposed to have died out 65 million 
years ago, until it was found off the coast of Madagaskar in 1938 – still was 
identical to the fossils of 65 million years ago. Scheele mentions sharks that did 
not change over millions of years. Army ants did not change during 100 million 
years. Pleisiosaurus exhibits little changes during a period of 135 million years. 
Sea turtle, 110 million years old, did not change during this period. Blue-green 
algae (Cyanobacteria) are known as the oldest “living fossils”, dated to be 3,5 
billion years old, yet “they are essentially identical to the blue-green algae that 
are still living today”. 
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After hesitantly starting to explore the importance of mutations for its 
theoretical stance, neo-Darwinism, the New synthesis, eventually 
settled for the combined operation of mutation and natural selection. 
However, since mutations are defective (if Darwin knew anything 
about mutations he would have realised that they are “injurious”) in 
99% plus of its occurrences,25 combining the neo-Darwinian idea of 
mutation with Darwin’s notion of natural selection results in a 
straight-forward contradiction. The neo-Darwinian argument is in-
deed that the majority of mutations that are actually defective, may 
turn out to be advantageous when “nature selects” them through 
changing circumstances. Yet Darwin (1859a:131) ascribed a much 
more severe (“extinctive”) power to natural selection: 
On the other hand, we may feel sure that any variation in the 
least degree injurious would be rigidly destroyed. This pre-
servation of favourable individual differences and variations, 
and the destruction of those which are injurious, I have called 
Natural selection, or the Survival of the fittest. Variations neither 
useful nor injurious would not be affected by natural selection, 
and would be left either a fluctuating element, as perhaps we 
see in certain polymorphic species, or would ultimately become 
fixed, owing to the nature of the organism and the nature of the 
conditions. 
What neo-Darwinism appreciates as a turn-around, that is, changing 
devolution into evolution, in terms of Darwin’s position would have 
achieved to opposite outcome: “... any variation in the least degree 
injurious would be rigidly destroyed”! This means that the neo-
Darwinian view of what is injurious (the majority of mutations) flatly 
contradicts Darwin’s own understanding of the relation between 
what is “in the least degree injurious” and the effect of natural selec-
tion upon it (“rigidly destroying it”). 
8. The uniqueness of humankind 
Although the continuity postulate of the modern humanistic science 
ideal largely dominated modern thought up to the nineteenth 
century, the problem of discontinuity and irreducibility constantly 
made itself felt in various disciplines. Modern physics, for example, 
in its mechanistic main tendency, adhered to a functionalistic under-
standing of the universe which was assumed to be both continuous 
                                      
25 Dobzhansky (1967:41) explains: “Mutation alone, uncontrolled by natural selec-
tion, could only result in degeneration, decay, and extinction.” 
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and infinitely divisible. However, with the discovery of the discrete 
quantum of energy by Max Planck it turned out, as we have ob-
served earlier, that physical space is neither continuous nor infinitely 
divisible. Konrad Lorenz is therefore justified in his sharp rejection of 
the mechanistic postulate of continuity:  
From events in the atom to those in the history of humanity 
inorganic as well as organic developments occur in leaps. Even 
though some quantitatively summarized processes in this 
course of events might superficially appear continuous, even-
tually it turns out to be as discontinuous as the major qualitative 
changes in organic evolution, first clearly understood by Hegel. 
(Lorenz, 1973:186.) 
Although the neo-Darwinian synthetic evolutionary theory in principle 
chooses for a physical basic denominator, efforts are nonetheless 
made to account for the qualitative differences which supposedly 
emerged in the course of the continual evolutionary process. J. Hux-
ley warns against the “nothing but” trap into which many evolution-
ary and natural scientific explanatory techniques fall:  
... if sexual impulse is at the base of love, then love is regarded 
as nothing but sex; if it can be shown that man originated from 
an animal, then in all essentials he is nothing but an animal. 
This, I repeat, is a dangerous fallacy. We have tended to mis-
understand the nature of the difference between ourselves and 
animals. We have a way of thinking that if there is a continuity 
in time there must be a continuity in quality. (Huxley, 1968:137.) 
Simpson (1969:8) also distinguishes between non-biotic and biotic 
levels (of organisation) and is convinced that it is preposterous “to 
base ... a concept of scientific explanation wholly on the non-
biological levels of the hierarchy and then to attempt to apply it to 
the biological levels without modification”. Any treatment of this pro-
blem would, according to Simpson (1969:21) have to avoid the ex-
tremes of both vitalism and “physicism”. Against an extreme 
physicalist reductionism he (Simpson, 1969:26) openly states: “I 
think it fair to say that in this respect, as truly biological investigation 
and an attempt to explain vital phenomena, unmodified reductionism 
has failed.” Because of this he remains convinced that evolutionary 
organismal biology cannot be reduced “to a philosophy taking ac-
count only of the physical, non-biological aspects of the universe” 
(Simpson, 1969:7). Simpson rejects an extreme reductionism (phy-
sicalism), and speaks of the physical and biological aspects of reali-
ty. Does this mean that with this distinction he implies an irreducibi-
lity in principle between the physical and biotical aspects? Appa-
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rently not, since when he says that the principles of evolutionary 
biology (which otherwise do not contradict anything in physics) 
transcend the principles which can be deduced from non-living 
atoms and molecules, he still adds: “... but without becoming any-
thing other than naturalistic” (Simpson, 1969:7). Only the concept of 
organisation in the end indicates in which respects living and non-
living things differ: “It is the complexity and the kind of structural and 
functional assembly in living organisms that differentiate them from 
non-living systems” (Simpson, 1969:7). In Simpson’s view the bioti-
cal aspect emerges out of the organisational complexity of natural 
systems, which actually implies that the term biotical aspect cannot 
be understood in the sense of an irreducible ontic mode. Although 
not stated in extreme reductionistic, or unmodified reductionistic 
terms, Simpson (1971) still defends a form of physicalism, albeit a 
physicalism in which it appears as if the differences among various 
levels of organisation are taken into account. 
Against this background, Simpson (1971:271) says the following 
about the human being:  
Man has certain basic diagnostic features which set him off 
most sharply from any other animal and which have involved 
other developments not only increasing this sharp distinction 
but also making it an absolute difference in kind and not only a 
relative difference of degree.  
These are pretty strong words – “an absolute difference in kind”.26 
It appears that a basic element in this picture is the difference be-
tween the sensitive intelligence of animals and the rational intelli-
gence of human beings. Only in the latter case do we discern a 
normed accountability – something completely lacking in animals. In 
the absence of acknowledging the normativity of human life, experi-
ments with animals (in respect of their alleged thinking and lingual 
capacities) therefore never investigated instances of, for example, 
illogical behavior. Chimpanzees unsuccessfully struggled for nine 
months to copy a square and a circle (in Munster, Germany). How 
                                      
26 A more extensive account of the distinctive human functioning within the logical-
analytical, cultural-historical and lingual aspects of reality is found in Strauss 
(2009; Chapter 4). 
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then will one be able to show that they can form an illogical concept, 
such as that of a square circle?27 
Likewise neo-Darwinism considers animals to be capable not only of 
the use of tools, but also of making them. However, the archaeo-
logist Narr points out that the presence of a person’s inventive, 
formative, imagination provides the foundation for practically useful 
archaeological criteria in terms of which typically human tools can be 
distinguished. 
• The form of the produced tool might not be suggested or deter-
mined by the original raw material (e.g. in distinction from a stick 
from which irritating leaves and twigs need merely be removed). 
• The function of the tools might not be suggested (a rock in its 
natural shape is a strengthening of the fist; a stick an elongation 
of the arm or fingers), that is, tools may not be merely extended 
bodily organs. 
• The manner of production might not be suggested, with appeal 
to the technical moment that implies that tools must be formed by 
means of (formed or unformed) tools (cf. Narr, 1974:105; 1976: 
99-101).28 
In addition to the unique human functioning within the logical-
analytical and cultural historical aspects of reality their function 
within the sign mode also highlights the distinctness of being human. 
It is interesting to note that at birth the human larynx is positioned in 
exactly the same way as that of all other mammals. One reason for 
this is that the human infant needs a way for milk intake that is 
separate from the windpipe. The baby can breathe calmly while 
drinking. Exactly because of this the human infant is incapable of 
speech – like all mammals. Only by means of the gradual removal of 
this division, caused by the downward movement of the larynx – 
freeing the larger pharynx cavity – is the human person eventually 
enabled to speak. Only human beings possess an intermediate area 
between the nasal cavity and the larynx where air and food channels 
                                      
27 Cassirer (1969 [1910]:16) mentions a rundes Viereck (a round square) as an 
example of an illogical concept. Yet this example is actually already found in 
Immanuel Kant’s Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als 
Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (Kant, 1783:341; § 52b). 
28 Simpson (1969:91) defines a human being summarily as “the only living animal 
that uses tools to make tools”. 
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cross (Laitman, 1985:282). If we define a speech organ as that 
bodily part which exists solely in service of the production of speech 
sounds, then a surprising fact is that there are no human speech 
organs. Let us enumerate possible candidates: the lungs, larynx, 
mouth cavity, palate, teeth, lips and nose cavity. Without exception, 
all these organs perform primary functions that would continue to 
function in their normal way even if human beings never uttered a 
single word (Overhage, 1972:243). Human language simply takes 
hold of all these different organs in the production of speech sounds. 
This highly developed and subtle cooperation, especially of three 
organs so heterogeneous in character as the mouth, the larynx and 
the brain, integrated in the production of human speech sounds, 
makes it rather difficult, if not hopeless, to provide us with a causal 
evolutionistic explanation of this astonishing phenomenon. The 
question arises what number of miraculous changes should have 
occurred to produce the articulation conditions necessary for truly 
human language formation. 
9. Inconsistencies in the attempted synthesis between 
neo-Darwinism and Christianity 
Since theoretical thinking is characterised by modal abstraction 
every academic discipline ultimately operates on the basis of a 
theoretical view of reality in which (implicitly or explicitly) an account 
is given of the diversity of (modal) aspects of reality. Neither the 
discipline of physics nor that of biology has succeeded to escape 
from the presence of such an all-pervasive theoretical view of reality. 
The story of the concept of matter within the development of physics 
displays the successive exploration of the first four modal aspects of 
reality (cf. Strauss, 2009:402-416). The theoretical view of reality of 
the Pythagoreans advanced the overall perspective that everything 
is number. After the discovery of irrational numbers (cf. Von Fritz, 
1945) – revealing within the seemingly form-giving and delimiting 
function of number something formless – Greek mathematics as a 
whole was transformed into a spatial mode (the geometrisation after 
the initial arithmetisation). As a consequence, material entities were 
no longer described purely in arithmetical terms. The aspect of 
space now provided the necessary terms required to characterise 
material entities. This spatial angle of approach remained in force 
until the rise of modern philosophy, since philosophers like Des-
cartes and Kant still saw the essence of material things in their 
extension. Particularly through the work of Galileo and Newton, the 
main tendency of classical physics eventually underwent a shift in 
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perspective by attempting to describe all physical phenomena exclu-
sively in terms of (kinematic) motion. Beginning with the introduction 
of the theory of the atom by Niels Bohr in 1913, and actually already 
from the discovery of radio-activity in 1896 and the discovery of the 
energy quantum h, modern physics realised that matter is indeed 
characterised by physical energy-operation. 
From this brief explanation, it is clear that different aspects served to 
characterise matter by reducing it to one of the four most basic 
modes of explanation of reality – starting with the perspective of 
number and then proceeding to the aspect of space, the kinematic 
aspect and eventually the physical aspect of reality. 
The history of biology, as we have noted above, displays a similar 
plethora of reductionistic orientations that explored different modes 
of explanation, alternatively elevating certain modal aspects to serve 
as exclusive modes of explanation. Just recall the mechanistic orien-
tation (Eisenstein), the physicalistic approach (neo-Darwinism), neo-
vitalism (Driesch, Sinnott, Schubert-Soldern, Haas and Heitler), 
holism (Adolf Meyer-Abich), emergence evolutionism (Lloyd-Mor-
gan, Woltereck, Bavink, Polanyi), the organismic biology of Von 
Bertalanffy, and panpsychism (Teilhard de Chardin, Bernard 
Rensch), complexity theory (Behe) and the idea of “intelligent de-
sign”.29 
Owing to the irreducibility of the various modes of explanation these 
different ismic orientations (schools of thought) are mutually ex-
clusive. Neo-Darwinism, for example, with its emphasis on the ran-
domness of the combined effect of natural selection and mutation, 
does not allow for any form of teleology or purpusiveness (goal-
directedness) and therefore contradicts the basic orientation of the 
(neo-)vitalist, organismic and holistic trends of thought. Pan-psy-
chism, by contrast, opts for another basic denominator (mode of 
explanation). Rensch (1971:159) characterises his own position as 
“panpsychistic” and ”identistic” – that is, all events are founded by 
something which is neither psychic nor material, but which has psy-
chic and material characteristics. Within the context of the primacy 
of the modern humanistic science ideal with its levelling continuity 
                                      
29 It is surprising that Michael Behe who is so critical of neo-Darwinism still falls 
into a physicalistic mode of speech when he refers to “molecular life” (Behe, 
2003a:5). Just like Darwin, Behe and other intelligent design theorists also do 
not acknowledge genuine biotic laws – see the penetrating analysis and critique 
of Zylstra (2004). 
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postulate, it implies that the evolutionary continuum is considered in 
terms of a psychic basic denominator. If no discontinuities exist in 
the evolutionary line of descent, then lower animals, plants, and 
even the inorganic sphere should exhibit certain corresponding “psy-
chic” components – a consequence indeed drawn by Rensch 
(1959:352): “According to our previous findings and discussions we 
are justified in assuming ... psychic (parallel) processes of some 
kind in all living beings”. This “psychic” continuity also bridges the 
transition from living to non-living:  
Here again it is difficult to assume a sudden origin of first 
psychic elements somewhere in this gradual ascent from non-
living to living systems. It would not be impossible to ascribe 
‘psychic’ components to the realm of inorganic systems also, 
i.e. to credit nonliving matter with some basic and isolated kind 
of ‘parallel’ processes. (Rensch, 1959:352.)  
Rensch therefore believes that such a panpsychistic approach has 
the advantage of not having to assume that the psychic, as some-
thing basically distinctive from the material, appeared on our planet 
at some stage after the emergence of living creatures. As a sub-
stitute for the assumption that psychic phenomena appeared sud-
denly after an astronomic and geological prehistory of millennia, 
Rensch (1969:134-135) considers it far more conceivable and ac-
ceptable to link the evolution of the psychic to the evolution of the 
material (anzufügen), that is to ascribe a protopsychic nature to 
matter.  
Without questioning the continuity postulate it is alternatively pos-
sible to adhere to the primacy of the humanistic – in which case 
freedom has to be projected back to the level of atomic and 
molecular interaction. H. Jonas is “forced”, in the interest of the pri-
macy of the freedom ideal, to recover freedom on the level of the 
material. “Our position is in actual fact that it is possible to observe 
freedom already at the level of metabolism – yes, even that it is the 
first form of freedom.” (Jonas, 1973:13.) His indebtedness to the 
dialectical humanistic ground motive of nature and freedom is clear, 
for according to him “life manifests this polarity in a durable fashion 
in the fundamental antithesis within which its existence weaves 
itself: the antithesis of existence and non-existence, of self and 
world, of form and matter, of freedom and necessity” (Jonas, 1973: 
15-16). 
In line with Huxley’s rejection of the “nothing but” fallacy and Simp-
son’s emphasis on an absolute diference in kind the neo-Darwinian 
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geneticist, Thoedosius Dobzhansky, acknowledged typical laws for 
different levels – thus approximating the idea of sphere-sovereighty 
initiated by Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper and expan-
ded by Dooyeweerd in an ontological sense. Dobzhansky (1967:43) 
writes:  
The phenomena of the inorganic, organic and human levels are 
subject to different laws peculiar to those levels. It is un-
necessary to assume any intrinsic irreducibility of these laws, 
but unprofitable to describe the phenomena of an overlying 
level in terms of those of the underlying ones.  
Whereas someone like Richard Dawkins claims that “Darwin made it 
possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” (Dawkins, 1986:6), 
many Christians allege that God “created through evolution”. Of 
course the question is what kind of evolution is intended? Did God 
“use” the neo-Darwinian model of random mutation and natural se-
lection, or the neo-vitalist conviction that living things are constituted 
by physical matter and by an “immaterial vital force” (Haas,1974),30 
or one or another emergent-evolutionistic process (with continuity in 
descent and discontinuity in existence), or the typo-strophism theory 
of Schindewolf (1969; 1980), or perhaps the idea of punctuated 
equilibria advanced by Gould? These questions, that can be multi-
plied, relate to the underlying philosophical problems of universality 
and what is individual as well as to the foundational position of 
constancy in respect of change. In particular they are also con-
nected to the difficulty that the mentioned ismic standpoints within 
modern biology each represent the deification (absolutisation) of a 
different aspect within creation, substituting God as creator. These 
orientations are not only mutually exclusive for they also contradict 
the Biblical distinction between God and (the various aspects of) 
creation. 
The attempted synthesis between Christianity (sometimes identified 
with theology) and “evolution” in practice normally terminates in a 
position where the physicalist orientation of Darwin and neo-
Darwinism serves as a point of departure, but along the line the 
closer one gets to a Biblical perspective, gets transformed into a 
(neo-)vitalistic and/or emergent-evolutionistic orientation. An exam-
ple of this line of development is found in the writings of Van Huys-
                                      
30 “Physical-chemical forces and laws are in themselves unable to bring forth the 
structures of meaning which we identify as the life plan, and even less can it 
produce a non-material bearer of life plans.” (Haas, 1974:355.) 
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steen. They demonstrate a strange mixture of different positions at 
once. On the one hand he claims that our universe “and that all it 
contains is in principle explicable by the natural sciences” (Van 
Huyssteen, 1998:75) and on the other he warns that we should not 
overextend rationality “to explain everything in our world in the name 
of natural science” (Van Huyssteen, 1998:115). He commences by 
subscribing to the neo-Darwinian presupposition of continuity and 
chance (cf. Van Huyssteen, 1998:111) and then subtly reverts to a 
view that is a mixture of emergent evolutionism and vitalism (cf. Van 
Huyssteen, 1998:37, 121, 125, 127, 134, and 151). He does not rea-
lise that these orientations contradict the basic assumptions of neo-
Darwinism. 
In his more recent work, Alone in the world? Van Huyssteen (2006) 
continues to accept the continuity between species in respect of 
instincts or rational abilities as well as the continuity of organic 
evolution from “unicellular organisms to humans” (Van Huyssteen, 
2006:81, 86-87). Just as in the case of his 1998 work he discerns 
something unique within human cognition, culture and religious 
worldviews, and even characterises these facets as something 
irreducible. He believes that within the “grandiose universal natural 
history” once cultural evolution commenced it “obeyed its own 
principles”. This is quite similar to the quoted position of Dobzhansky 
– concerning different laws peculiar to different levels. Yet, while 
Dobzhansky rejects the idea of irreducibility, Van Huyssteen de-
fends it, for according to him culture is not reducible to biological 
entities (Van Huyssteen, 2006:78). While distinguishing between 
laws of nature (Van Huyssteen, 2006:55) and cultural evolution with 
its “own principles”, as well as alluding to “particular modes of ex-
planation” (Van Huyssteen, 2006:98), one may ask what the origin 
of these (irreducible) laws and principles are? Since laws condition 
(in the sense of making possible) what is subjected to them these 
laws cannot originate in a process presupposing them. Likewise, if 
there are “own principles” for culture, these principles, making possi-
ble cultural activities, cannot originate in cultural processes.  
Given his 1998 position, where it was claimed that the universe and 
“all it contains is in principle explicable by the natural sciences”, we 
once more read the opposite in 2006. With affirmation Van Huys-
steen quotes the “evolutionary epistemologist” O’Hear who says:  
For religious believers it will be natural to interpret the 
emergence of consciousness and self-consciousness as re-
velatory of something deep in the universe, something inex-
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plicable by physics, something behind the material face of the 
world. (Van Huyssteen, 2006:97.)  
Yet, while leaving the house of deterministic neo-Darwinian evolu-
tionism through the front door, the back door also received a last 
brief visit: “But for evolutionary epistemology to be truly nonreduc-
tionistic and nondeterministic, we should take seriously the argu-
ment, made even by Wuketits, that we humans are in a sense gene-
tically disposed to religious and metaphysical beliefs” (Van Huys-
steen, 2006:99; cf. Wuketits, 1990:155, 199). If we are “genetically 
disposed to religious and metaphysical beliefs” we still believe that 
the “natural sciences” (in this case biology-genetics) can explain 
everything. 
10. Theoretical problems facing emergent-evolutionism 
Material entities have their highest active (i.e. subject) function with-
in the physical aspect of reality. The idea of emergent properties 
may suggest that increasing complexity can produce, from a mere 
physical constellation, the biotic aspect of reality. Alternatively it can 
assume that an additional subject function can “emerge”, namely the 
biotic aspect (as Klapwijk argues – cf. Klapwijk, 2008). Can a par-
ticular function change into another function? Just consider the 
conviction that physical entities were transformed into biotic (i.e. 
living entities). 
The problem here is a quite serious theoretical issue, for if we 
accept that the physical function can change (be “transformed”) into 
the biotic aspect, the next problem is if there will still exist a physical 
aspect of reality after the change of the physical into the biotical? 
This seems to be impossible if the physical aspect turned into the 
biotical aspect. A less rigorous version may contemplate the ques-
tion whether or not it is possible for one aspect to give rise (“birth”) 
to the existence of another aspect? For in this case the continued 
existence of the initial aspect may be maintained. Yet, if this transi-
tion does not eliminate the initial (or primary) aspect, it is incorrect to 
claim that it changed into a different aspect. While holding on to the 
idea of transformation the only other option seems to be to defend 
some or other view of emergence in terms of which it is claimed that 
an on-going process eventually gives rise to various new aspects of 
reality. It is often asserted that once these additional aspects 
emerged (came into existence) they are irreducible. Emergent evo-
lutionists (such as defended by Lloyd-Morgan, Whitehead, Alexan-
der, Woltereck, Bavinck and Polanyi) indeed want to have it both 
ways: continuity in descent (in the process of origination) and dis-
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continuity in existence (in structure). Structure thus becomes the 
product of the genetic process of becoming.31 It seems as if some 
attempts at establishing a synthesis between Christianity and evolu-
tion gets entangled in these intrinsic antinomies present in the 
thought of emergent-evolutionistic thinkers. 
11. Ultimate commitments 
We mentioned the argument of Clouser that a religious belief is “a 
belief in something as divine per se no matter how that is further 
described, where ‘divine per se’ means having unconditionally non-
dependent reality” (Clouser, 2005:23). He takes philosophical mate-
rialism as an example, the view “that reality is ultimately physical, so 
that everything is either matter or dependent on matter” (Clouser, 
2005:35). He does not deny the differences between theory and 
religion, but argues that no single academic discipline can avoid the 
directing and guiding influence of one or another religious belief in 
the sense just defined. His example of materialism fits neo-
Darwinism completely – the latter is the outcome of a specific (mate-
rialistic) presupposition. Some contemporary biologists even go fur-
ther. Lynn Margulis, from Massachusetts University, who is known 
for her theory regarding the nature of mitochondria (a subcellular 
organ that probably previously was an independent bacterium), for 
example, remarked that ultimately history will see neo-Darwinism as 
a “minor twentieth-century religious sect within the sprawling 
religious persuasion of Anglo-Saxon biology” (Behe, 2003a:26). That 
atheism is a faith-conviction that is defended by the immunologist, 
George Klein, who holds that his “atheism is not based on science, 
but is an a priori faith commitment”. In response to the accusation 
that he is an agnostic, Klein says:  
I am not an agnostic. I am an atheist. My attitude is not based 
on science, but rather on faith ... The absence of a Creator, the 
                                      
31 Emergence evolutionists openly admit that their position is burdened by an 
inner antinomy. Richard Woltereck does so in his Ontologie des Lebendigen 
(1940:300 ff.), while Michael Polanyi (1968:393) writes:  
We have reached the point at which we must confront the 
unspecifiability of higher levels in terms of particulars belonging to 
lower levels, with the fact that the higher levels have in fact come into 
existence spontaneously from elements of these lower levels. How 
can the emergent have arisen from particulars that cannot constitute 
it. 
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non-existence of God is my childhood faith, my adult belief, 
unshakable and holy (Klein, 1990:203; cf, Lennox, 2007:34).32 
The embarrassment with constancy as dominant pattern of the fossil 
record caused Gould to take refuge in the allopatric theory according 
to which at “another place” “new species arise in very small 
populations that become isolated from their parental group at the 
periphery of the ancestral range”. This gives rise to “speciation in 
these small isolates” that occurred in a way that is “very rapid by 
evolutionary standards” (Gould, 1992:61). Without any factual sup-
port, this speculative claim serves to avoid the said embarrassment 
with the “sudden appearance of species in the fossil record and our 
failure to note subsequent evolutionary change within them” (Gould, 
1992:61).This assumption of Gould is similar to the embarrassment 
with the origination of the first living entity. Wilhelm Troll (1973:8-9) 
categorically states, in his standard text book on botany, that the 
question concerning the origination of life on earth, owing to its 
speculative nature, does not belong to the domain of biology as an 
empirical science. 
Yet, in spite of the absence of the “intermediate forms” (required by 
evolution and not provided by paleontology – Kitts) and the do-
minant constancy of fossil forms over millions of years (Gould and 
Eldredge) neo-Darwinism religiously upholds their belief in the con-
tinuous transition of all forms of “life”. Their ultimate commitment 
appears to override the factual evidence and to eliminate the re-
quired scientific modesty exemplified in a sincere docta ignorantia 
(learned ignorance). 
Appendix 
A summary critique of the pretentions of neo-Darwinism 
Some of the key claims of neo-Darwinism are (most of them touched 
upon in die preceding article): 
1. It is an objective and neutral theory that is not influenced by 
any philosophical or religiuous presuppositions. 
2. It is a purely special scientific (i.e. biological) theory. 
                                      
32 Other important perspectives that exceed the brief analysis of this presentation 
are more extensively treated in Strauss (2009; Chapters 4 and 7). 
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3. It is a purely natural scientific theory. 
4. It is sufficiently supported by factual data. 
Are these claims justified? 
1. Is biology objective and neutral? 
• The mere existence of diverging trends of thought contradicts the 
claim to neutrality. 
• Neo-Darwinism in particular departs from an accepted faith in the 
“creative power” of the combination of mutation and natural 
selection, that is, from an assumed purely accidental process. 
The term evolution is endowed with the power of an origin. It 
replaces the Biblical creational faith within living nature, where it 
is assigned with the capacity to serve as the foundation of the 
total diversity of forms of life. 
2. Is neo-Darwinism a purely scientific theory? 
Neo-Darwinism is not purely special scientific in nature, because it 
tells a story embracing the universe in all respects. It starts with 
elementary particles, atoms, molecules and macromolecules and it 
ends with humankind – the result of a meaningless material process, 
the accidentally most intelligent animal, humankind was not fore-
seen (Simpson). The focus on the totality of our experiential world 
disqualifies neo-Darwinism to be a special scientific theory – it is a 
full-grown philosophical theory regarding the becoming of the entire 
universe. 
3. Is it a purely natural scientific theory? 
The spiritual background of neo-Darwinism reflects diverse perspec-
tives that are not derived from the natural sciences. 
• Its emphasis on change derives from the rise of historicism at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. This historicism inspired 
Darwin’s preoccupation with change – at the cost of constancy. 
• Darwin’s idea of a “struggle for existence” goes back to Hobbes 
who portrayed the assumed (hypothetical and not historical) 
“state of nature” as a battle of everyone against everyone 
(bellum omnium contra omnes). Combined with a writing from 
Malthus, An essay on the principle of population and its effects of 
the future improvement of society (1798), this inspired Darwin to 
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develop his idea of the “struggle for existence” (the expression 
“surival of the fittest” was proposed by Spencer).33 
The contemporary social-political thinker, Kropotkin (1842-1921), 
already in 1903 pointed out that Darwin presented a skewed 
image of nature to us for it ignores the fact that next to struggle 
phenomena there are also numerous examples of peaceful and 
harmonic co-existence (symbiosis). This once more highlights 
the influence of social philosophic conceptions on the thought of 
Darwin.34 
• The whole idea of selection is also highly problematic. Darwin 
explicitly states that he derives it from the human ability to 
choose (select), and that as a result he employs it in a meta-
phorical sense: “I have called this principle, by which each slight 
variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, 
in order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection” (Darwin, 
1968:115). McGrath (1999) correctly observes that Darwin 
makes an appeal to a conscious process of selection: “The ana-
logy is apparently being allowed to imply that the active selection 
of the animal or plant breeder is somehow paralleled within 
nature itself. This is certainly suggested by his frequent referen-
ces to ’nature’ as an agent who actively ‘selects’ variants which 
she approves as good” (McGrath, 1999:172). Alfred Russell 
Wallace indeed wrote to Darwin that this analogy is misleading: “I 
am led to conclude that the term itself, and your mode of 
illustrating it, however clear and beautiful to many of us, are not 
yet the best to impress it on the general naturalist public” (cf. 
McGrath, 1999:172). 
• Of course the assumed (accidental) origination of the first living 
entities on earth cannot be explained in terms of natural selec-
tion, because the operation of the latter presupposes living 
entities already in existence.35 
                                      
33 However, Sober remarks that “the degree to which Malthus changed the 
direction of Darwin’s thought remains controversial” (Sober, 1987:15). 
34 Gould argues that Darwin’s accidental story does not provide any grounds for 
the idea of progress, although he advances this progress idea through the back 
door of a complex and dubious ecological argument. Gould (1996:143-144) 
writes: “He provided no clear rationale for biotic predominance – and Kropotkin 
and other critics would nail him on this point later.” 
35 Von Bertalanffy (1973:160-161) remarks: “In contrast to this it should be pointed 
out that selection, competition and ‘survival of the fittest’ already presuppose the 
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4. Is it sufficiently supported by factual data? 
The first living entity cannot be accounted for, the simultaneous 
appearence of the main groups of animals during the Cambrian ex-
plosion contradicts Darwin’s expectation of gradual incremental 
succession,36 while the fact that most species “enter the evolution-
ary order fully formed and then depart unchanged” (Berlinski, 2003: 
158) even caused Eldredge to add the remark that “this destroys the 
backbone of the most important argument of the modern theory of 
evolution” (quoted in Van den Beukel, 2006:106).37  
Widely known and popular arguments and facts found in many text-
books and popular accounts of evolution turned out to lack factual 
support. Gould referred to the just quoted “widely held myth about 
horse species as gradualistically varying parts of a continuum”. 
Behe ridiculed the absence of any sound account of the origination 
of the first living entity or complex organs – just compare it with what 
Darwin said: “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ 
existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, 
successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break 
down” (Darwin, 1859a:219). We mentioned that Darwin’s view of 
natural selection, according to which injurious variations “would be 
rigidly destroyed”, cannot be reconciled with mutations that are in 
more than 99% instances “injurious”. The embryos of Haeckel 
turned out to be fraudulent (Wells, 2003:180 ff.); the story of pep-
pered moths collapsed because “textbook pictures of peppered 
moths ... show specimens that have been manually placed on tree 
trunks” (Wells, 2003:190); almost all of dozens of so-called “vestigal 
                                                                                                             
existence of self-maintaining systems; they therefore cannot be the result of 
selection”. With reference to Meyer and Weber, Depew (2003:447-448) more 
recently writes that “… natural selection cannot in principle be the cause of life’s 
origin. Natural selection is a phenomenon that depends on the very sort of 
variation and heredity that exists in organisms and so can hardly be used to 
explain how organisms came into existence in the first place”. 
36 “Geological research … yet has done scarcely anything in breaking down the 
distinction between species, by connecting them together by numerous, fine, 
intermediate varieties; and this not having been affected, is probably the 
greatest and most obvious of all the many objections which may be urged 
against my views” (Darwin, 1859a:307). 
37 We mentioned that Gould quoted Prothero and Shubin, who wrote, in 
connection with the supposed evolution of the horse:  
This is contrary to the widely held myth about horse species as gra-
dualistically varying parts of a continuum, with no real distinctions 
between species. Throughout the history of horses, the species are 
well-marked and static over millions of years (cf. Gould, 1996:68). 
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organs” in the course of time appeared to have a useful function (cf. 
Mills et al., 2003:215 ff.).38 
Additional Remark on Australopithecus sediba (made public in 
April 2010) while checking the final proofs received from Koers: 
In newspapers, Carte Blanche (April 11) and the TV program 50/50 
(April 12) Australopithecus sediba is presented as the “missing link” 
and the direct ancestor of modern humans (Homo sapiens). The un-
bridled enthusiasm accompanying this discovery appears to confuse 
two distinct issues:  
• the well-preserved nature of this fossil compared to other Austra-
lopithecines fossils, such as Australopithecus afarensis (“Lucy”) 
and Australopithecus robustus; and  
• the relationship between the Australopithecines and modern hu-
mans. The logic of popular statements suggests that these well-
preserved fossils promoted them suddenly to become true 
ancestors of modern humans. 
The web page on Australopithecus sediba has a heading saying 
“Ancient skeleton may shed light on human evolution”: 
http://www.aolnews.com/article/scientists-to-unveil-possible-missing-
link-between-man-and-ape/19425931 
Another remark makes it clear that Australopithecus sediba is not an 
ancestor of modern humans for it merely may shed light on the 
(assumed!) transition between the extinct apelike ancestors of 
modern humans: “The fossil could provide new clues about the 
transition between the human species and its extinct, apelike an-
cestors.”39 
Another suggestion arising from this new finding is that the link may 
be via Homo habilis. When skull 1470 was made known in 1973 its 
estimated age was 2,8 million years – soon brought down to 
2 million years. It does not have the prominent eyebrows of the 
Australopithecines or Homo erectus forms, a relatively larger brain 
                                      
38 Additional perspectives on the uniqueness of the human being are found in the 
mentioned Chapter four of Strauss (2009). 
39 The Australopithecines lived between 5 and 1 million years ago – and Gould 
highlights the fact that the best documented Australopithecines recorded stasis 
of 0,8 to 1,0 million years (Gould, 2002:834). 
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capacity and a more Homo sapiens-like appearance compared with 
the Australopithecines. Yet, on the basis of investigating the balance 
organ of Homo habilis Homo habilis type never walked upright. What 
is merely suggested by the labyrinth is that Homo habilis was not 
more and also not less bipedal than the Australopithecines. Its 
structure looks like that of gibbons or apes, but in any case is not 
human (De Burgh, 1995:21 – for more detail cf. Strauss, 2009:115-
117). 
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